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OF JUDGES AND SCHOLARS: 
REFLECTIONS IN A CENTENNIAL YEAR * 
PAUL C. WEILERt 
Vancouver 
I 
A strange thing happened to the Supreme Court of Canada on 
the way to the celebration of this, its centennial year: the public 
discovered that the court exists. One may also surmise that the 
members of the court find this novel attention to be a rather 
mixed blessing. The tone of popular treatments of the court has 
been no more complimentary than the academic studies which 
have lain in obscurity for years. In this essay, I shall resist the 
urge to add another refrain to the litany of complaints about the 
performance of our final court. Instead, I am tempted by another 
target-the academic community itself. 
I 
The deficiencies in Canadian judicial performance are, in large 
measure, a product of the failure of Canadian legal theory. 
I believe there is a direct relationship between a nation's philos-
ophy of law and the character of its judicial decision-making. 
(By philosophy, I do not mean a logically worked out system, but 
rather a cast of mind, a point of view about what our judges are 
and should be doing.) Our courts are a part of the legal com-
munity, a community which embodies certain more or less 
articulate assumptions about the nature of law, the role of judges 
in the evolution of that law, and the relevance of the arguments 
and considerations which lawyers should advance to a court 'about 
how it should settle the law. Appearances notwithstanding, the 
effective law-making power of our final court of appeal is tangibly 
restricted to those possibilities which appear sound in the light of 
prevailing views about these fundamental issues. So when we 
shudder at some particularly distressing piece of legal craftsman-
* This paper is a revised version of an address delivered at a Joint 
Plenary Session of the Association of Canadian Law Teachers and the 
Canadian Political Scientists Association, on June 3rd, 1975, at the 
Conference of Learned Societies in Edmonton, Alberta. 
t Paul C. Weiler, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
Downsview, Ont. On leave, now Chairman, Labour Relations Board of 
British Columbia, Vancouver. 
LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN [VOL. L1I 
ship and prepare to apply some after-the-fact negative reinforce-
ment to the judges through a slashing law review critique, we 
should first of all consider how helpful was the Canadian scholarly 
analysis of that problem which they might have drawn on. The 
blunt truth is that too often the quality of our academic reflection 
matches the level of interest of our lawyers and judges in making 
use of it. 
To the extent that there has been sustained worthwhile 
reflection on the nature of judging in Canada, it has been directed 
largely at the problem of the influence-or lack of it-of legal 
rules in judicial reasoning. How free are the courts to go beyond 
established doctrines and take account of changing social values 
in refashioning our law? What are the limits which doctrines of 
precedent or canons of statutory interpretation place on the 
judicial contribution to legal change? Not for a moment should 
that effort be downgraded. Its aim is an expanded concept of the 
nature of law in the courts, one which requires that the judges 
offer equal deference to the policies and principles embedded 
beneath the surface of the rules. The assumption of this work is 
that only if our judges appreciate the full range of relevant legal 
considerations will they be capable of the quality of judicial 
craftsmanship which is required for the rational administration 
and evolution of our legal system. 
III 
There is some evidence in recent Supreme Court decisions that 
the lessons of scholarly analysis are beginning to sink in. The 
Justices appear now to recognize their own responsibility for the 
course which Canadian law will take and are openly coming to 
grips with the problems which this poses. One striking example 
1is the recent decision in Harrison v. Carswell. Sophie Carswell 
was an employee in a small store and a member of a union. When 
the employees went on strike in accordance with provincial labour 
legislation, they became entitled to picket their employer. How-
ever, the store was located in a large shopping centre, the walks 
and roads of which were owned by a private developer who had 
leased the store premises. Although the picketing by the employees 
was entirely peaceful, they were asked to leave the shopping 
centre. When Carswell refused, she was charged with a violation 
of the Petty Trespasses Act.
2 
1 Harrison v. Carswell (1975), 75 CLLC 14, 286, at p. 15, 306 
(S.C.C). 
2 R.S.M., 1970, c. P-50. 
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For our purposes, the important issue raised by these facts 
is the power of our Supreme Court to rework the ancient common-
law concept of trespass to property in order to take proper 
account of such modern developments as public shopping centres 
and collective bargaining legislation. Not surprisingly, Chief 
Justice Laskin was undeterred by the challenge: 3 
It seems to me that the present case involves a search for an 
appropriate legal framework for new social facts which show up 
the inaptness of an old doctrine developed upon a completely dif-
ferent social foundation. The history of trespass indicates that its 
introduction as a private means of redress was directed to breaches 
of the peace or to acts likely to provoke such breaches. Its subsequent 
enlargement beyond these concerns does not mean that it must be 
taken as incapable of further adaptation but must be applied on 
what I can only characterize as a level of abstraction which ignores 
the facts. 
From that premise, the Chief Justice fashioned a new legal 
privilege to engage in peaceful picketing in the public area of a 
shopping centre, pursuant to a lawful strike against a tenant of 
the centre. As is becoming his habit, he wrote this in dissent. But 
what is encouraging is that the majority decision did not retreat 
into a purely formal analysis of the problem. Instead, Mr. Justice 
Dickson recognized that it was legally possible for the Supreme 
Court to introduce that legal innovation into the fabric of our law. 
He explicitly stated his reasons why he chose not to take that 
step, in the light of this concept of the scope and limits of 
judicial creativity: 
4 
The submission that this Court should weigh and determine the 
respective values to society of the right to property and the right 
to picket raises important and difficult political and socio-economic 
issues, the resolution of which must, by their very nature, be 
arbitrary and embody personal economic and social beliefs. It raises 
also fundamental questions as to the role of this Court under the 
Canadian Constitution. The duty of the Court, as I envisage it, 
is to proceed in the discharge of its adjudicative function in a reasoned 
way from principled decision and established concepts. I do not 
for a moment doubt the power of the Court to act creatively-it 
has done so on countless occasions; but manifestly one must ask-
what are the limits of the judicial function? ... 
If there is to be any change in this statute law, if A is to be given 
the right to enter and remain on the land of B against the will of B, it 
would seem to me that such a change must be made by the enacting 
institution, the legislature, which is representative of the people 
and designed to manifest the political will, and not by the Court. 
3 Supra, footnote I, at p. 15, 313. 
4 Ibid., at pp. 15, 308-15, 309. 
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For my purposes, the significance of Carswell is not the 
specific legal conclusion at which it arrives.5 Rather, it resides in 
the fruitful questions which are posed and the dialogue which is 
opened up. Moreover, both judgments display a willingness on 
the part of the court to look to scholarly work for assistance in 
that fundamental judicial inquiry. It is up to legal scholars to 
take up that challenge. The main point which I wish to make in 
this essay is that in order to be of any substantial help, Canadian 
legal theory must go beyond its emphasis on the logic of legal 
rules, and occupy itself with the problem of judicial role, especially 
the role of our final court of appeal. 
IV 
I begin with the simple assumption that the Supreme Court of 
Canada is not just a part of our legal system; it is also a major 
institution of Canadian government. An inescapable feature of a 
final appellate tribunal is that it establishes a society's legal policy 
in the course of adjudicating many, if not most, of the concrete 
disputes which come before it. But that merely states the problem; 
it does not solve it. It is not unfair to sum up the results of 
academic speculation about judicial policy-making in these terms. 
5 I would add the comment that a plausible case can be made for 
each position. This is not true of the substantive legal issue. Chief 
Justice Laskin thoroughly documents how anachronistic is the use of 
trespass law here and provides an intriguing legal concept to avoid 
that consequence. I believe that Mr. Justice Dickson tacitly agrees on 
the merits that the law should be changed. Prima facie, the court is 
the appropriate institution for renovating such outmoded common law 
doctrines (for reasons I have elaborated upon in my book, In The 
Last Resort (1974), pp. 61-65). But here the court is asked to intervene 
in the high-visibility, emotion-laden field of labour relations. There are 
substantial reasons why a court should ordinarily leave it to the 
legislature to adopt new legal policies which tilt the delicate balance 
of economic power between the contesting parties (see In The Last 
Resort, ibid., pp. 123-125). I do not mean to suggest there are no 
counter-arguments which may be made in support of Laskin C.J.'s judgment. 
Carswell raises a subtle and intriguing problem within the framework 
of analysis which I have developed in my book, but that will have 
to await another occasion. However, I cannot resist adding this other 
note. The Ontario Court of Appeal effected a much bolder change in 
the industrial relations balance of power when it created a per se bar 
on secondary picketing in the absence of any legislative authorization 
of any kind: Hersees of Woodstock v. Goldstein (1963), 38 D.L.R. 
(2d) 449 (Ont. C.A.), criticized in Arthurs, Comment (1963), 41 Can. 
Bar Rev. 573. The propriety of that judicial innovation has not yet 
reached the Supreme Court of Canada. The logic of Mr. Justice Dickson's 
argument for the majority in Carswell points clearly to reversal of the 
Hersees doctrine. See Weiler, Legal Values and Judicial Decision-making 
(1970), 48 Can. Bar Rev. 1, at pp. 42-46. 
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Our judges should make some law, but not too much. How much 
is too much is left up to judicial discretion. The judges may be 
pardoned for finding this not terribly helpful. 
How does one go about improving the level of analysis? The 
starting point is a realistic assessment of what our courts are like. 
Who gets appointed a Supreme Court judge? How are they 
recruited and what is their status and accountability when they 
get to the court? What types of problems come before the court, 
how are they formulated, and what resources of information and 
experience are the judges able to bring to bear on them? What 
are the instruments which the Supreme Court has available for 
the solution of social problems, how influential are judge-made 
standards of behaviour likely to be, and what mechanisms has 
the court for monitoring and learning from the results of the 
social experiments which it has initiated? 
Only when we understand what the court is like can we 
make an informed judgment about what it should be doing. Here 
I refer especially to the final court's policy-making function. What 
are the sectors in which the court should take an aggressive, 
activist posture in shaping the law and what are the areas in 
which the court should be restrained, deferring to policies adopted 
by others? Judges who understand the reasons why courts are 
given certain tasks-such as the administration of a Bill of Rights 
-are best able to navigate the troublesome shoals which they 
face. But it is precisely at this point that Canadian legal theory 
is deficient. As a result, even if it wanted to use it, our Supreme 
Court would now find available only a tiny fraction of the help 
that American scholars give the United States Supreme Court. 
V 
Two decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada serve to illustrate 
the point I am making. And in keeping with my resolve not to 
score any easy points off the court in this essay, I have selected 
two of the best judgments in its recent history. The first-written, 
alas, in dissent-came in Murdoch,6 perhaps the most publicized 
Supreme Court decision in recent memory. (And it is not without 
irony that the point at issue in the case was one of provincial, 
private law, an area which several commentators have argued 
should be totally removed from the court's jurisdiction.) All 
students of the court are familiar with Mrs. Murdoch's unsuccess-
ful suit for an interest in a ranch which was legally owned by her 
6 Murdoch v. Murdoch, [1974] 1 W.W.R. 361 (S.C.C.). 
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husband, a ranch upon which, according to her husband, she did 
"just about what the ordinary rancher's wife does": 7 
Haying, raking, swathing, mowing, driving trucks and tractors and 
teams, quietening horses, taking cattle back and forth to the reserve, 
dehorning, vaccinating, branding, anything that was to be done. 
Mr. Justice Laskin's remarkable dissent-which according to a 
C.B.C. radio reporter made him a "jurisprudential folk hero"-is 
a model of the kind of argument a judge may legitimately make 
in clearing away the doctrinal obstacles to the legal relief that 
justice and sensible social policy demands. Yet even his reasoning 
reflects the curious reticence of the Canadian legal establishment 
about meaningful judicial renovation of our common law. 
Throughout his judgment beats the theme of the "extraordinary" 
contribution of Mrs. Murdoch, the fact that "her labour is not 
simply housekeeping, which might be said to be merely a reflec-
tion of the marriage bond". Chief Justice Laskin appeared to be 
trying to stake out the unique features of this case, so as to make 
clear that, as he put it:8 
The Court is not being asked in this case to declare an interest in 
the appellant merely because she is a wife and a mother; nor is 
there here an implicit plea for a community property regime to be 
introduced by judicial fiat. 
The Chief Justice did go on to hold, in the unusual circumstances 
of this case, that Mrs. Murdoch was entitled to an interest in the 
ranch on the basis of the equitable doctrine of constructive trust: 9 
In making the substantial contribution of physical labour, as well 
as a financial contribution, to the acquisition of successive properties 
culminating in the acquisition of the Brockway land, the wife has, 
in my view, established a right to an interest which it would be 
inequitable to deny and which, if denied, would result in the unjust 
enrichment of her husband. Denial would equate her strenuous 
labours with mere housekeeping chores which, an English Court has 
held, will not per se support a constructive trust. 
What I find significant in the tenor of these remarks is the 
unspoken common ground which he shares with the majority 
judges in Murdoch: that it would be quite improper for the 
Supreme Court to begin a general reform of our system of prop-
erty law for the benefit of the ordinary wife and mother. (And 
I should also mention my own, quite disconcerting discovery that 
the female law students in my Supreme Court seminar this past 
year were unanimously of that view as well.) 
7 Ibid., at p. 374. 
8 Ibid., at p. 380. 
9 Ibid., at p. 384. 
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But why? Even if we were to assume that the legislature is 
the better forum for adopting a new matrimonial property law, 
there is no reason why judicial efforts cannot make a substantial 
improvement on what we have now. As Chief Justice Laskin put 
it, "the better way is not the only way". But I take issue also 
with his comment that: 10 
No doubt, legislative action may be the better way to lay down policies 
and prescribe conditions under which and the extent to which 
spouses should share in property acquired by either or both during 
marriage. 
In my view, a realistic and sophisticated comparison of 
legislature and court suggests that there is considerable doubt 
about whether -theformer is the superior institution for the reform 
of our law of matrimonial property. I do not mean to deny the 
significant virtues of the legislative route. Heated emotions are 
aroused in this area, and these the representative character of the 
legislature may help defuse. There are a number of problems 
related to the property issue-for example, maintenance, and 
child custody and support-and perhaps these are best tackled 
in a comprehensive statutory package. Finally, in order .to serve 
both of these objectives, the legislature may commission a full-
scale study by a law reform body which can hear representations 
from numerous interested groups and then prepare a detailed set 
of proposals. 
The first problem with this all-too-familiar argument is that 
it idealizes the legislative process. It assumes that simply because 
the legislature might do a better job, it will do the job. Matri-
monial law is a sufficiently ticklish issue that an elected body 
always faces 'the temptation to find that the safest course is to 
do nothing, and to claim that there are too many other pressing 
problems on the legislative agenda. The evidence from statutory 
reform of matrimonial property law is not terribly sanguine. As 
well, there is reason to believe that 'this subject is not readily 
amenable to once-and-for-all legislative action which, of necessity, 
uses a procrustean legal formula. Family relationships are simply 
too variable, too complex, to be captured in that manner. Once 
that legal formula has been embedded in our statute books, it is 
exceedingly difficult to move the legislature back into the area to 
take a second look and to develop the necessary qualifications. 
From each of these perspectives, we can appreciate the 
positive virtues of judicial law reform. The courts are moved to 
action by concrete problems brought by litigants such as Mrs. 
Murdoch, who acted as a one-person lobby demanding considera-
10 Ibid., at p. 380, italics mine. 
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tion of her case in the light of the fundamental principles and 
policies of the law. Unlike a pressure group demanding action of 
the legislature, her position must be dealt with one way or the 
other by a court which has to adjudicate the immediate dispute 
and give its reasons for doing so. Moreover, a court which is 
receptive to this kind of argument is able to conduct its revisions 
and refinements of the law in an incremental way. The scope of 
the alteration in the previous law may then be tailored to the 
scope of the policies which the judges are confident about in the 
immediate case. Ample room is always left in the discursive 
language of judicial opinion for changes of direction, or even 
retreat, if this appears politic. Only gradually does a new legal 
principle emerge from this cumulative experience. 
In the larger perspective, one should perceive these two 
governmental institutions in a law-making partnership, making 
ideal use of their complementary virtues. The judges are faced 
with the immediate pressures for legal change. They should feel 
entitled to break the logjam holding back reform. A court can 
take initiatives which likely will prove satisfactory, but remain 
confident that their mistakes can still be undone by legislative 
reversal. Ultimately, the court will run up against institutional 
barriers which limit their capacity to achieve comprehensive 
reform. But in the meantime, the momentum will have developed 
by which the legislature-society's ultimate law-making resource 
-- can step in to finish the job. 
But it is not my objective to substantiate that case in detail 
here. My point is simply this: neither before nor after Murdoch 
have Canadian judges had the benefit of a sustained analysis of 
the proper scope 'and limits of judicial reform of matrimonial 
property law. I find that particularly ironic in light of the millions 
of words flowing from expensive law reform studies across the 
country. One finds in these rarely a mention of this central institu-
tional issue of where and how the process of changing our law of 
family property should be carried on. Nowhere do .the reformers 
advert to the ability of the courts to implement certain changes 
in the common law without direct legislative intervention. Not 
surprisingly, this failure is matched by our judges' refusal to 
consider -the significance of such law reform studies in their 
decisions (and that is true even of judges such as Chief Justice 
Laskin who often utilize the work of the same scholars appearing 
in the law reviews). It has always seemed to me that the quest 
for a fair and satisfying legal framework for a basic human situa-
tion such as marriage is never-ending and that the quality of law 
which we achieve will reflect the peculiar feature of the govern-
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mental institutions which produce it. Conscious recognition of 
these truths is conspicuous by its absence from the product of law 
reformers in -this area. It behooves the academic critics of the 
refusal by the Supreme Court majority in Murdoch to take even 
the first step in this process of legal change to consider that, 
before letting loose their critical broadsides. 
VI 
Let me turn next to the judicial role in the public law area. A 
common thread runs through such diverse fields as administrative 
law, federalism law, and civil liberties law. In each, the court 
reviews the judgments of another agency of government-whether 
it be the legislature, a department, or an administrative tribunal-
by measuring them against such legal instruments as the British 
North America Act,11 the Bill of Rights,12 or a regulatory statute 
such as a labour code. Here I sense a curious contrast with the 
prevailing judicial attitude to private law reform, one which we 
saw expressed in Murdoch. There is much less reluctance about 
the value of active judicial involvement, about the Supreme Court 
imposing its own views of socio-legal policies upon other public 
officials. The trend is seen most dramatically in .the reception to 
the Drybones13 interpretation of the legal effect of the Bill of 
Rights. A much stronger tide is bringing about pervasive judicial 
control over the administrative process, flowing especially from 
the McRuer Report.14 But there did appear to be one exception 
to the trend in recent years, and this was the retreat which the 
Supreme Court had gradually beaten from the Privy Council's 
front line position in constitutional decision-making. That is what 
I find so intriguing about the recent Thorson15 decision which 
promises some renaissance in the court's role as the umpire of 
Canadian federalism. 
Thorson, the former Chief Justice of the Exchequer Court, 
was a vocal leader of the opposition to the federal government's 
bilingualism policy. Having lost the battle against the Official 
Languages Act 16 in the legislative arena, he carried his struggle 
into the courts, alleging that the legislation was unconstitutional. 
There he was met with a fifty-year-old doctrine, established by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in the Smith17 case, which denied 
11 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.). 
12 R.S.C., 1970, Appendix III. 
13 Re Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282. 
14 Royal Commission Inquiry Into Civil Rights (1968). 
15 Thorson v. A.-G. of Canada (1974), 43 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
16 R.S.C., 1970, c. 0-2. 
17Snith v. A.-G. of Ontario, [1924] 3 D.L.R. 189 (S.C.C.). 
LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN [VOL. LIII 
standing to individuals who sought, as members of the public or 
as taxpayers, to challenge the validity of statutes under the 
British North America Act. In another carefully-crafted opinion 
by the Chief Justice, but this time for the majority, the court 
overturned the Smith doctrine and held that Thorson had standing 
to proceed with his action. 
Within the premises from which he begins-assumptions 
which are the traditional wisdom of our constitutional scholars-
Chief Justice Laskin's reasoning is impeccable. He poses this 
"telling" question: "whether a question of constitutionality should 
be immunized from judicial review by denying standing to anyone 
to challenge the impugned statute."? His response is forthright 1 8 
It would be strange and indeed, alarming, if there was no way in 
which a question of alleged excess of legislative power, a matter 
traditionally within the scope of the judicial process, could be made 
the subject of adjudication.... 
Nor was it an answer that the Attorney General of one of the 
provinces might question the constitutionality of the federal statute 
in a proceeding of its own. Canadians should have the vehicle of 
a "public action", brought by an individual to enforce "the right 
of the citizenry to constitutional behaviour by Parliament where 
the issue of such behaviour is justiciable as a legal question". As 
the Chief Justice puts it: 19 
I am unable to appreciate how an argument of principle can be made 
that such a wrong, an illegality which is certainly justiciable, should 
go uncorrected at law, whatever may eventuate as political redress. 
Within that perspective, the Smith doctrine would appear to be 
an irrational relic in our public law, and most of us will applaud 
the readiness of our Supreme Court to proclaim its demise. 
However laudable the craftsmanship of the majority opinion, 
I have serious reservations about the substance of the Thorson 
decision. The time is long past for a re-examination of the present 
status of judicial review of federalism conflicts in Canada, an 
institution whose legal roots lie in the Colonial Laws Validity 
Act.20 One need not gainsay its value in the early days of the 
British North America Act in the 1870's in order to believe that 
judicial review is outmoded in the mature federalism of the 1970's. 
Take as an example just one of the prominent concerns of 
Canadian federalism at this time: the problem of pricing, sale, 
18 Thorson, supra, footnote 15, at p. 7. 
19 Ibid., at p. 15. 
20 1865, 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63 (U.K.). 
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and taxation of oil and gas. Each of these propositions holds true 
for that issue: 
21 
(a) Neither the language nor the established principles of the 
British North America Act offer any firm guidance to a legal 
solution to the conflict. 
(b) A court which is required to dispose of a concrete lawsuit 
will have to fashion constitutional policy from its own 
resources. 
(c) An adjudicative body such as the Supreme Court faces serious 
institutional obstacles in developing a technically satisfactory 
solution to the problem of legislative jurisdiction. 
(d) An unrepresentative tribunal such as the court risks serious 
damage to its long-run legitimacy if it is constantly forced 
to come down on one side or the other of these heated 
political battles which are the stuff of Canadian federalism. 
(e) Judicial retreat from the role of umpire of Canadian federal-
ism will not leave the task of conflict-resolution undone. As 
the oil and gas issue graphically illustrates, constitutional 
negotiations between governments have replaced constitu-
tional adjudication as the most prominent institution in 
recent Canadian federalism. 
(f) Contrary to the traditional legal point of view, judicial settle-
ment of who has the right to exercise legislative jurisdiction 
detracts from the likelihood of voluntary, political agree-
ment about the acceptability of particular governmental 
programmes. 
On the basis of these judgments, I have elsewhere staked out an 
extreme position: the desirability of abolishing judicial supervision 
of Canadian federalism except in the case of direct conflict in 
actual statutes from two jurisdictions.2 2 I argued for that position 
not because I expect it to be realized in the foreseeable future, 
but rather as an heuristic framework which should define our 
approach to resolving immediate federalism concerns. There is 
nothing jurisprudentially radical about the argument. We have 
recently enjoyed a relatively sophisticated dialogue of the need 
21 While I state them in the form of conclusions, I recognize, of 
course, how controversial each of these propositions is. The evidence 
and argument in support of them are marshalled in Chapter 6 of my book, 
op. cit., footnote 5, and my article The Supreme Court and the Law of 
Canadian Federalism (1973), 23 U. of T.L.J. 307. 
22 In the pieces referred to in footnote 21. An earlier version of 
the argument was published as Chapter 3, The Supreme Court of 
Canada and Canadian Federalism, of the book, Law and Social Change, 
edited by Ziegel (1973), p. 39. 
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for, and the value of, judicial use of our written Bill of Rights to 
invalidate statutory law. It is generally recognized by scholars 
that there is a plausible argument for both sides of that debate. 
Yet our constitutional lawyers have thrown up their hands in 
horror at the comparable suggestion for judicial application of 
the British North America Act. 
But this refusal to think about the unthinkable has proved 
distinctly unhelpful to the judges who have to grapple with a 
problem such as that posed in Thorson. Only a romantic could 
disagree, after a close examination of our court's performance in 
the constitutional area, that the role of judicial umpire is at best 
a necessity, not a virtue. Within that perspective, the limitations 
on private standing have been a valuable roadblock against 
judicial intervention too soon and too often. They have afforded 
the necessary breathing space to the process of legislative innova-
tion and constitutional bargaining. Suppose then that the affected 
governments reach a consensus about the federal arrangements 
needed to deal with a pressing social problem in Canada. It 
would seem strange to allow a private citizen, for his own pur-
poses, to try to persuade a judge to invalidate the programme 
adopted by one elected legislature on the grounds that it could 
only be enacted by another legislature, particularly when the 
latter has no objections itself. In my view, Thorson has moved 
Canadian constitutional law in precisely the opposite direction 
from the one suggested by a sophisticated analysis of the judicial 
role. 
But it is not my purpose to document hat case here. I 
merely wish to underline this point: even someone as steeped in 
our constitutional theory as Chief Justice Laskin finds it not only 
strange, but indeed, alarming to entertain that subversive thesis. 
He has a great deal of company. Our constitutional scholarship-
at least, the Anglophone version-does not seriously address itself 
to these absolutely fundamental questions about the contemporary 
viability of this judicial role of umpire in our federal system. 
VII 
These rather sketchy remarks about the recent decisions in 
Carswell, Murdoch and Thorson are intended to depict this juris-
prudential question. What contribution may the Canadian public 
rightfully expect from its final appellate court in the solution of 
our pressing issues of legal policy. I could have drawn instead 
on numerous other problems recently before the Supreme Court: 
due process for the parolee; a proper measure of control of police 
enforcement of the criminal law; rationalization of our archaic 
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law of occupier's liability; equality before the law for Indians; 
responsibility of the corporate director; and a host of others. But 
these are sufficient to underscore the theme I sounded at the 
outset. Judicial reasoning about particular social and legal prob-
lems is always heavily influenced by a community's veiled 
philosophy of the proper scope and limits of the judicial function. 
We do not now have in Canada a sustained dialogue bringing this 
basic issue of political and legal theory out into the open for 
conscious reflection. It just is not good enough for us to continue 
to draw, quite uncritically, on models for judicial performance 
developed in Britain, France, or the United States. One hundred 
years after the creation of the Supreme Court of Canada, twenty-
five years after it became our final court of appeal, it is high time 
to get the scholarly task underway. 
